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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
TORTS: EXTENT OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER THE
DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE AS
APPLIED TO AUTOMOBILES
Fleming v. Alter, 69 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1953)
Frankel v. Fleming, 69 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954)
Defendant Alter, an automobile rental agency, delivered an automobile to defendant Frankel. The signed rental contract between
Alter and Frankel contained some restrictive covenants but was silent
as to who could drive the automobile. Frankel entrusted the automobile to a woman living with him as his wife in a local hotel. While
subsequently driving the auto, she negligently injured plaintiff Fleming, who appealed from a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for
Alter. HELD, the rental of an automobile to a bailee implies consent
for it to be driven by members of the bailee's family. The Court considered the driver to be an "ostensible member" of the bailee's family.
Judgment reversed. In an appeal by defendant Frankel from a judgment for Fleming, HELD, the bailee of a rented automobile is liable
for injuries caused by the negligence of a person to whom he delivers
possession of the auto, especially when that person is "to all intents
and purposes" the bailee's spouse. Judgment affirmed.
Several states have statutes that impose liability upon the owner
of an automobile negligently operated by a person to whom the owner
has entrusted the car.' Florida alone, however, has applied liability
to automobile owners through a judicial extension of the dangerous
2
instrumentality doctrine.
The Florida Supreme Court first included automobiles within the
scope of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co.3 In subsequent cases, however, the Court refused
to give force to the broad implications of the Anderson case. In
Eppinger & Russell Co. v. Trembly4 the Court reversed judgment
'E.g., CAL. Vxs . CODE ANN. §402 (Deering Supp. 1953); D.C. CODE §§40-43 (Supp.
1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. §49-1004 (Cum. Supp. 1953); IowA CODE §321.493 (1954);
MicH. STAT. ANN. §9.2101 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
2For a thorough discussion of the subject see Note, 5 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 412
(1952).
373 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917). In a subsequent rehearing of this case the
Florida Court reiterated its extension of liability to one not the negligent operator,
i.e., the automobile owner, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
490 Fla. 145, 106 So. 879 (1925).
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because the trial judge charged the jury that the question involved
was whether the defendant gave its employee either express or implied permission to use the vehicle, to take it into his custody or control, and to operate it upon the public highways, and that it was
immaterial whether the employee was using it for his master's business
or for the employee's personal pleasure. Nevertheless, in Lynch v.
Walker5 the Court repeated its conclusion that the automobile is a
dangerous instrumentality, saying: 6
"When an owner authorizes and permits his automobile
to be used by another he is liable in damages for injuries to
third persons caused by the negligent operation so authorized
by the owner."
The Court has not always been explicit in dealing with the element
of consent in bailor-bailee situations. The Lynch case involved express consent, but in a later case, Carterv. Baby Dy Dee Service, Inc.,7
the Court dealt with consent only inferentially and held that the bailee
was in constructive possession even though he was not actually driving
the vehicle. On this basis the Court did not have to deal with implied consent of the bailor for someone other than the bailee to drive
the automobile. Ragg v. Hurd" involved a limited bailment, and the
facts showed that the accident occurred after the specified period of
entrustment had terminated. The Court decided the case on the basis
of legal title to the automobile and did not discuss the lack of the
owner's consent to the use of the automobile beyond the limitations
of the bailment. The appellant's brief, however, dealt primarily with
the question of title, so it is not surprising that the Court did not
discuss the element of consent.
The Lynch case expressly overruled the holdings in conflict with
the formula stated in the Anderson case; the Eppinger case is in
direct conflict with this formula and is therefore rendered impotent.
Since the charge of the trial judge in Eppinger encompassed both
express and implied consent, it might be argued that the Court in
the Lynch case intended to include both express and implied consent
as entrustment within the scope of the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine. This point is of little importance now, for in the Alter case
5159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268 (1947).
6159 Fla. 188, 194, 31 So.2d 268, 271 (1947).
7159 Fla. 380, 31 So.2d 400 (1947).
860 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1952).
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the Court once again resorted to the element of consent to affix
liability upon the auto rental agency. The Court reasoned that there
was an implied consent on the part of the bailor that the members,
or ostensible members, of the bailee's family could operate the automobile. This is the first time that the Court has directly employed
the concept of implied consent to hold a bailor liable under the
dangerous instrumentality theory. In previous cases involving consent, either the consent was express or the case was decided on another
point of law. In the Lynch case the Court found the element of consent as a requisite to owner liability; in the Ragg and Carter cases
there was no specific consideration of the element of consent; and in
the Alter case the Court based liability on implied consent by the
bailor to use of the automobile by another than the bailee. It should
be noted that in each of these cases liability attached to a financially
responsible defendant.
In the companion instant case of Frankel v. Fleming the Court
further demonstrated its ingenuity in finding an economically responsible defendant by placing liability upon a person who neither owned
nor operated the accident vehicle. This reasoning is strengthened
by the finding that the negligent driver was "to all intents and purposes" the defendant's spouse. It was not without precedent that
the Court disregarded the element of ownership: In Ford Motor Co.
v. Floyd9 liability was placed on a bailee who had in turn lent the
automobile to the negligent driver; and in Wilson v. Burkel° an
"ostensible" owner of a truck was held liable, although the lessordriver had the record title. The "ostensible ownership" concept resulted from the fact that the name of the lessee was painted on the
side of the truck.
The result reached in the Frankel case was not one against which
Frankel, as bailee of the accident vehicle, was likely to have been insured. Likewise, the finding of implied consent in the Alter case, when
in fact there was probably no conscious consideration of consent at
all, demonstrates the length to which the Court will go to find a "deep
pocket." These decisions indicate that ownership, like consent, is a
vehicle for enhancing plaintiff recoveries and that it may be ignored
by the Court when a financially responsible person, not the owner,
delivers the auto to the negligent driver.
The social and economic problems relating to automobile acci9137 Fla. 301, 188 So. 601 (1939).
1053 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1951).
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dents are beyond the scope of this comment. A brief review of the
development of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine as applied
to automobiles in Florida, however, indicates that the gradual judicial
extension of that doctrine on a case-by-case basis is not a satisfactory
solution of the problem.
It is submitted that the Florida Legislature should study the
automobile accident problem in those states that impose vicarious
liability by statute and enact appropriate legislation to define more
precisely the limits of liability in cases of this nature.
WILLIAm GARcIA
LEE WEISSENBORN
RICHA D ZIMMERMAN
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